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An Uncouth Approach to Language Recursivity 
 
Eleonora Russo  &  Alessandro Treves 
 
 
A simple-minded view is presented here on the problem of the origin of 
language, which dismisses any relation with hitherto unobserved specific 
language microcircuits in the cortex as well as with gross connectional 
hierarchies which are seen also in other mammals. In this view, language 
arises out of a capacity for spontaneous latching dynamics, which emerges 
when the connectivity of an extensive cortical network, which need not be 
hierarchical, crosses a critical phase-transition threshold. 
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1. Cortical vs. Cognitive Organization 
 
Neuroanatomy, proceeding slowly but surely at the tranquil pace of a descriptive 
science, would have the authority to inform a basic understanding of the neural 
mechanisms subserving higher cognitive capacities. For the faculty of language, 
this has not happened. There is a fundamental mismatch between the conceptual 
structures invoked to describe the complexity of language — parsing trees, hier-
archies of grammars, principles and parameters — and those emerging from the 
observation of the articulation of the human nervous system. Neuroanatomical 
dynamics unfold over evolutionary time scales of millions of years, and their 
main organizational principles have been scholarly described for about a 
hundred years (e.g., Lorente de Nó 1938). Language dynamics, even though in 
the most stable parametric aspects may stretch over several thousand years 
(Longobardi & Guardiano 2009), unleash their astonishing power in the rapid 
acquisition of a language by a child — in a few years. 
 As a result, linguists tend to ignore taking stock of the stable organization 
apparent in the human brain, and at times nurture the mistaken expectation that 
a sudden discovery from the world of biology, like that of the structure of DNA, 
will at some point revolutionize the relation between language and the brain, and 
crack the neural codes for syntax. The Language Acquisition Device (LAD), a re-
markable abstract construct (Briscoe 2000), might then acquire the semblance of a 
neuronal apparatus, taken to be hiding, like the Holy Grail, perhaps in one of the 
frontal sulci, disguised to non-believers as standard cortical circuitry. While the 
quest for the LAD goes on, allured by reports of quantitative differences and 
asymmetries in area 44 or 45 (Uylings et al. 2006, Amunts et al. 2010), it may be 
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useful to briefly review salient features of cortical organization. 
 
1.1. Origin and Evolution of the Cerebral Neocortex 
 
Higher mental processes in the human species massively involve the cerebral 
cortex, though it should be noted, not to the exclusion of other structures such as 
the cerebellum or the basal ganglia. The cerebral cortex derives from a structure, 
the pallium or dorsal component of each hemisphere, as it bulges out of the fore-
brain behind each olfactory bulb, that was presumably common also to the ances-
tors of reptiles and birds, and whose ancient amniotic phenotype is thought to re-
semble most closely the cortex of modern reptiles. In the evolution of mammalian 
lineages, the two dramatic events that separated them from other amniotes were 
the lamination of the dorsal cortex and the reorganization of the medial cortex 
into the modern mammalian hippocampus. These two events likely occurred bet-
ween three and two hundred million years ago, with outcomes that are anatomi-
cally clear and functionally obscure, but in any case are very much with us to this 
day. No further major reorganization has occurred since, common to all mam-
malian species, and differences in the organization of specific radiations, such as 
the incomplete granulation of cetacean cortex (Huggenberger 2008), are more in 
the way of amendments than bright new ideas. 
 The two remarkably stable traits of a 3-fold differentiated hippocampus 
and a 3-fold laminated cortex (Fig. 1) seem to us to express the fundamental 
mammalian geist, and the crucial challenge for theories of mammalian neural 
computation to try and explain; yet we feel rather isolated in our interest for 

















Figure 1:  In mammals, the dorsal cortex is laminated (left) and the medial cortex is reorganized 
into the hippocampus, differentiated into 3 main sub-regions (right). In both structures the 
essential mammalian innovation is the insertion of an input layer of granule cells (orange) 
feeding into the pyramidal cells (yellow). Both these traits are common to all mammals, and 
neither has anything to do with the faculty of language. 
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Be it as it may, it is hard to identify further qualitative jumps in the structure of 
our nervous system, beyond these that we underwent together with other mam-
mals. Although the simple-minded notion of cortical uniformity (Rockel et al. 
1980) has been fiercely criticized (Herculano-Houzel et al. 2008, Rakic 2008), mod-
ifications and specializations on the basic mammalian design are prevailingly 
quantitative (Krubitzer 1995, Semendeferi et al. 2010). Particularly in relation to 
the language faculty, they come nowhere close to drawing a boundary, for 
example, between our brain and that of non-speaking apes, as sharp as can be 
drawn between, say, bats (mammals) and starlings (birds) — however startlingly 
recursive starlings may be (Gentner et al. 2006). 
 The dominant neuronal constituents of the cerebral cortex are the pyra-
midal cells, which are defined by a long axis oriented perpendicular to the corti-
cal sheet. The main new element which sets the mammalian neocortex apart from 
the reptilian paleocortex is the insertion of a layer of granule cells, layer IV, 
where many afferent inputs terminate, and which separates infragranular from 
supragranular pyramidal layers (Fig. 1, left). It is thought that the new arrange-
ment facilitates a precise point-to-point afferent connectivity, enabling the for-
mation, in part by self-organizing processes, of fine topographical maps (Treves 
2003). This occurs throughout the expanse of the so-called isocortex, although 
layer IV is more prominent in sensory cortices, consistent with its role in setting 
up orderly sensory representations, which become progressively fuzzier in more 
advanced areas. In frontal cortex, layer IV may remain undifferentiated, sug-
gesting that the cognitive enhancement that accompanied, in the most advanced 
mammals, the quantitative expansion of the frontal lobes, is not picking up on the 
technological advance of a laminated cortex. In particular, the faculty of lang-
uage, which arises recently and only in the human species, appears unrelated to 
lamination, which emerged hundreds of millions of years ago, in all mammals. It 
seems doubtful, therefore, to ascribe special significance to limited differences in 
the exact density of distinct cortical layers (Amunts et al. 2004). The concurrent 
differentiation of the medial cortex into the regions DG, CA3 and CA1 of the 
hippocampus (Fig. 1, right), with their strikingly idiosyncratic circuitry (Treves et 
al. 2008), is likewise common to all mammals and entirely unrelated to language.  
 
1.2. Cortical Hierarchies  
 
In the reptilian cortex, one distinguishes a lateral, a dorsal and a medial portion, 
and the olfactory origin of this most anterior component of the brain remains 
engraved in a clear direction of olfactory information flow, from lateral through 
dorsal to medial, leading to the old-fashioned but phylogenetically correct inter-
pretation of the hippocampus as the motor division of the olfactory sensory-
motor circuit. Even in those mammals, in which lateral olfactory cortex is re-
duced to little more than a residual, olfactory information from the bulb accesses 
it directly, a reminder of its former primacy. The other modalities, notably vision, 
audition and somatic sensation, which long ago penetrated and colonized the 
cortex from their more posterior original stations, send afferent inputs not 
directly but through the thalamus to the dorsal cortex, and there join the flow to-
wards the medial component. In more complex mammals these new ‘settlers’ are 
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seen to have established an increasing number of visual, auditory and somato-
sensory maps, leading to the great expansion of the dorsal cortex. Such maps, 
including advanced processing areas in which topography has become so vague 
as to have been erstwhile overlooked (Kaas 1997), are laid out in a hierarchy from 
peripheral (primary sensory) towards central/medial. The hierarchy finds unam-
biguous expression in the arrangement of the cortico-cortical connections: Lower 
(more peripheral) areas send inputs mainly from their supragranular layers 
towards the layer IV (whether or not populated by granular cells) of higher areas, 
which send, mainly from their infragranular layers, back projections to lower 
areas, which terminate there in layer I. This connectivity pattern allows neuro-
anatomists to determine which of two areas is higher up in the hierarchy. 
 Originally the pallium, like the dorsal aspect of the spinal chord, is sensory. 
The motor cortex is thought to have differentiated relatively late, with mammals, 
from parts of the somatosensory cortex. Does the motor cortex, which has no 
layer IV, sit on top of the cortical hierarchy defined by cortico-cortical connec-
tivity? Hardly so. It is the hippocampus, and other limbic components adjacent to 
it, that the laminar origin and termination of the projections elect as their sup-
reme leaders (Barbas 1986). In fact, both in the temporal and in the frontal lobes it 
is the more lateral areas, which are more laminated, that project axons that termi-
nate deep into the medial temporal or caudal orbitofrontal cortices respectively, 
which therefore are higher order in the connectional sense (Rempel-Clower & 
Barbas 2000). Information flows towards the limbic system, towards establishing 
memories, whereas the stream leading to motor cortex and the expression of 
overt behavior is more of a diverted back projection towards the periphery. It 
should be noted that these connectivity patterns are not rigorous rules but rather 
statistical trends, and that they may just reflect fossil functionalities, simply 
because no more modern organizational principle has come to supersede them. 
Even in this perspective, that is a connectional hierarchy we certainly have. 
 What are the changes that have then occurred in our neocortex, over this 
last couple of hundred million years? The most striking one, across several mam-
malian species, is in size, accompanied however by the parcellation of the cortical 
expanse into an increasing number of areas, in what is known as the process of 
arealization. Areas are defined by sometimes very subtle differences in cellular 
composition or laminar organization, that make the cortex resemble a patchwork 
of tonalities of the same hue, more than a blanket with continuously shaded 
colors. In sensory regions it appears very clearly that boundaries between areas 
are determined by the edges of topographic sensory representations, whether or 
not salient histological differences are seen with the neighboring area. In so-
called simple mammals, a sensory modality may be represented by one or two 
topographic maps, before information is fully mixed with that from other modali-
ties; in complex and more arealized mammals like ourselves, tens of distinct 
areas, each a complete map of sensory space, may represent a single modality. 
Several areas present further granular or quasi-granular structures, such as the 
mini-column, hyper-columns and pinwheels of cat and monkey visual cortex or 
the barrels of rat somatosensory cortex (Kaas 1997). These traits, sometimes 
popularized as evidence for a generic columnar organization principle, appear 
instead to be specializations that, in certain areas and in certain species, refine ad 
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hoc the common design expressed by laminated neocortex (Rakic 2008); the 
proliferation of distinct areas, in contrast, appears as a universal option available 
across species and modalities, and utilized more by some and less by others. 
 What keeps cortical areas together? Cortico-cortical connections. Unlike 
local connections, comprised by axons that never leave the gray matter or by the 
early departing collateral branches of those that do, cortico-cortical connections 
travel through the white matter, linking together areas that may sit at different 
levels of the periphero-hippocampal hierarchy, or at about the same level. Since 
cortico-cortical connections linking areas at about the same level, as well as local 
connections, are not hierarchical, and local and non-local connections are esti-
mated to come in roughly equivalent numbers, it is likely that strictly hierarchical 
connections are a minority, unlike what is assumed in certain neural network 
models. The cortex is largely democratic, and a given unit can usually find itself, 
depending on the circumstances of life, pre-synaptic or postsynaptic to another 
unit, or both. Causal reasoning, which informs many conceptual models of cog-
nitive processes, is manifestly inadequate to capture the web of potentially reci-
procal influences that cortical neurons (and cortical areas) exert on one another. 
 Whereas a democratic arrangement of all cortical neurons on the same 
footing is unique, many distinct ways can be conceived of ordering them in a 
strict or loose hierarchical arrangement (Fuster 2009). There are, in fact, at least 
two more ways to define a connectional hierarchy, beyond that based on the 
laminar pattern of connections between areas. One is to focus on the number of 
synaptic contacts on the basal dendrites of pyramidal cells, that Guy Elston (2000) 
has estimated to increase dramatically going from occipital to temporal and then 
frontal cortex. Basal dendrites receive mainly local recurrent excitation, so the 
observation suggests a posterior-frontal gradient from more input-driven to more 
recurrent circuits. Another way is to focus on the density of terminals of neuro-
modulators, in particular dopamine, which is particularly high in prefrontal 
cortex. This indicates a shift from a more rigid, operationally stable processing 
mode in posterior cortex to something more subject to multiple modulating 
influences in the front. Note that a dopamine gradient is seen also in birds, in the 
near absence of a full-fledged (and in any case mono-layer) cortex. These connec-
tional/anatomical hierarchies therefore partially overlap with each other, but 
only in a loose sense, and there is no evidence that they are evolutionarily re-
lated, or geared towards a common functional purpose. 
 
1.3. Task Switches and Prefrontal Cortex 
 
The scientific study of animal behavior has been in part based on the experi-
mental paradigm of classical conditioning, whereby, since Pavlovian times, an 
animal is exposed to stimulus x followed, in rapid temporal succession, by an-
other stimulus y. In its ‘operant’ variant the animal learns instead that to stimulus 
x it must respond y, to get reward z (or to avoid a punishment). In their crude 
simplicity such paradigms lend themselves to quantitative measures, more than 
ecological behavior, and have been extended in several directions. A trivial ex-
tension is to increase the number of stimulus-response associations, for example, 
to x1 the subject should respond y1 to get z, whereas to x2 the subject should res-
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pond y2, to x3, y3 and so on. Another type of extension, also increasingly used with 
human subjects, involves the combinatorial articulation of contingencies, for 
example, in context w1, to x1 one should respond y1, and to x2, y2, whereas in 
context w2, to x1 one should respond y2, and to x2, y1. The paradigm can obviously 
be complexified by expanding the number of associations, but also by adding 
levels, for example, in task v1 when in context w1, to x1 respond y1, while in w2, to 
x1 respond y2, and vice versa in task v2. Obviously, if elements v, w, x are purely 
labels, their complete configuration can be recapitulated in a compositional 
variable, say u, where, for example, u1 denotes ‘molecular’ configuration (v1, w1, 
x1), u2 denotes configuration (v1, w2, x1), etc. If, however, elements v, w, x are 
presumed to have a life of their own, both in the real world and as represented in 
the brain of subjects, it is convenient to maintain an atomic notation, to point out 
that a certain stimulus–response association, for example, x1 – y1, is correct in task 
v1 and in context w1, but not in situation (v2, w1). The experimenter can add levels 
of contingency n, n+1, n+2, ad libitum, making the paradigm progressively more 
complex.  
 A recurring observation from the analysis of brain lesioned patients and 
from neuroimaging studies is that the most anterior portions of the cortex appear 
to be involved in the correct learning and execution of the higher contingency 
levels, with perhaps the frontal pole necessary for the maximum complexity level 
nmax, in a particular type of paradigm, that normal human subjects are able to deal 
with. While there is no evidence that nmax is universal across different paradigms, 
the review of neuroimaging data and the ad hoc experiments designed by Badre & 
D’Esposito (2007) indicate that nmax can be higher than 3, in the sense that they 
can distinguish at least 4 hierarchical levels of contingency processing in a series 
of paradigms of increasing complexity.  
 One may represent such paradigms as a tree, where each variable is a 
branch generating at the end node the various thinner branches it can lead to. For 
example, branch w1 ‘generates’ x1, x2 e x3, which in turn ‘generate’ y5 and y8. The 
tree representation misses out the combinatorial nature of the process, because if 
a branch represents x1 generated by w1, a distinct branch shall represent x1 gener-
ated by w2, and yet another x1 generated by v1: The tree structure does not allow 
for multiple parents. Branches must then multiply, and more branches be 
assigned to the same event when produced by distinct ‘causes’. The apparent 
complication is counter-balanced by the logical clarity of the tree structure, which 
allows analyzing contingencies as in a chess game. Also in chess, the same move 
may follow distinct moves by the other player, or one’s own, but a mental tree 
representation may facilitate an assessment of the current situation, at the price of 
some redundancy. When mentally climbing on a branch that corresponds to ex-
actly the same situation of the pieces as another already visited branch, we only 
need to identify the two and retrieve the configuration of thinner branches, and 
leaves, already explored.  
 Inconsistencies may arise if, following Badre & D’Esposito, to the branches 
of a tree representation, conceived as descriptive of a mental process, one wishes 
to associate neuronal activity in certain cortical areas so that, for example, value 
x1 of variable x implies specific activity by a particular group of neurons. And one 
insists on a generically valid correspondence, so that those neurons ‘code’ for x1. 
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Then either the distinct branches corresponding to x1 when generated by distinct 
causes are represented by the activity of distinct groups of neurons, and then the 
tree hierarchy is clear but the coding is confusing and highly redundant, or they 
are all represented by the same group, in which case the coding is clear but the 
hierarchy loses much of its general significance, beyond the individual experi-
mental design, and the simple-minded logical tree of contingencies grows into a 
mangrove of multi-factorial events, eventually sublimating into a web of inter-
actions of surreal complexity — a cortical network, obviously. 
 
1.4. Syntactic Trees and Hierarchical Processing in Language 
 
A domain in which tree representations have been developed to more powerful 
sophistication and have offered what seems like an essential contribution is, of 
course, in the description of syntax in natural languages. Such phenomenolo-
gically observed syntax is often interpreted, in the various streams of formal ling-
uistics, as the imperfect biological manifestation of an exact underlying structure, 
which takes the form of an (upside-down) parsing tree. The terminal branches, or 
leaves, are associated roughly to individual words w, x, y, z of a natural language, 
while the non-terminal branches are associated to grammatical constructs A, B, C 
that do not appear overtly in natural language, but which are usually construed 
to have a neuronal representation of some form in our brain. From a start symbol 
S one generates a sentence by following not a single branch at each node, as in the 
complexified conditioning paradigms mentioned above, but multiple branches, as 
specified by certain rewrite or production rules. The corpus of sentences, gener-
ated by all possible ways of following each production rule, coincides conceptu-
ally with the language and can be represented by a gigantic tree, but even a 
single sentence corresponds to a tree that has as many leaves as, roughly, words 
— in contrast to single chess games and individual conditioning trials, which do 
not correspond to flourishing trees, but rather to destitute trees that have lost all 
leaves but one. There is thus a hierarchy of levels of analysis implicit in each 
sentence, if described by a parsing tree, which does not necessarily match the 
hierarchies necessary to parse other sentences, even within the same formal 
framework. 
 Chomsky (1955) has famously shown that such frameworks can be 
classified in a further, abstract hierarchy of frameworks, from unrestricted to 
context-sensitive to context-free to regular grammars. This was a beautiful 
achievement, fertile with insightful connections to then-developing computer 
science. Strictly speaking, it is more of an ordered set of inclusion relations than a 
bona fide hierarchy. (It does not befit a group of oligarchs to be much more num-
erous than the populace they rule over — if it is unrestricted grammars that are 
considered to be on top; and it does not belong to the rulers to be simpler-minded 
and less powerful than their subjects — if vice versa it is regular grammars that 
are considered to be on top.) In any case, the hierarchy of grammars has not been 
associated to hierarchical structures in the brain, except perhaps by some funda-
mentalists who have reputed simpler brains (which they might unwittingly 
ascribe to non-human primates, or to other mammals) to be capable of cognitive 
processes equivalent to regular grammars.  
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 Parsing hierarchies, instead, have been associated, in one of the most 
striking results of applying linguistic theories, with an orderly progression in the 
severity of the deficits in aphasic patients with different patterns of agrammatism 
(Friedmann 2001). In particular, among three groups of agrammatic patients, the 
one most impaired patient could be described as being able to access only the 
leaves and the thinnest branches of the syntactic tree expressing the structure of a 
Complementizer Phrase (CP), which, in the usual upside-down scheme, has the 
CP node at the top and the leaves dropping down at various levels on the left. 13 
severely impaired individuals could be described as being able to climb up two 
more levels, and 5 mildly impaired one to climb two further levels up, getting 
almost within sight of the CP node, as it were. These intriguing observations sug-
gest the psychological reality of parsing trees, as ways to order syntactic struc-
tures in terms of relative complexity; they do not however, point to a correspon-
dence between those trees and connectional hierarchies in the cortex, even 
though one is tempted to make that inference, given the long standing neuro-
psychological association between specific brain lesions and specific behavioral 
impairments.  
 The relation between agrammatic impairment and brain lesion is made 
problematic by the possibility, in general, that the same production rule be repre-
sented, in different derivations (in the parsing of different sentences) at different 
levels of the tree. Then, if different levels of the parsing tree are forced to cor-
respond to different levels in one of the connectional hierarchies of the cortex, 
either one assumes that a given production rule be potentially expressed by the 
oper-ation of several different cortical areas, or else one has to assume that the 
anatomo-functional correspondence is itself variable, from sentence to sentence, 
with maybe only the initial symbol S, which generates the whole sentence, repre-
sented in a stable manner in a mythical spring, somewhere in the frontal lobes, 
out of which every sentence gushes forth. Neither option is particularly appeal-
ing, once made explicit, but in implicit form they may guide our thinking, how-
ever unwilling we are to acknowledge it.  
 
 
2. Recursion and Recurrence 
 
Recursion, in whatever form, makes any attempt to impose a rigid hierarchical 
processing scheme on the cortex even more difficult, in the same plain sense in 
which social mobility disrupts rigid social hierarchies. Recursion in a weak form 
arises immediately when one conceives of a natural language as being satisfac-
torily approximated by the corpus generated by a finite set of production rules, in 
the sense that the same set of rules is applied at each step k in the generation of a 
sentence, however long, and potentially the same terminals (the leaves) can be 
attached at different steps. This might be dismissed as trivial recursion, but 
modelers who take seriously the challenge of identifying neuronal mechanisms 
apt to implement syntactic operators, for example, in terms of fillers and roles 
(beimGraben et al. 2008; Borensztajn et al. 2009; Battaglia & Pennartz, in press; see 
also Namikawa & Hashimoto 2004), devote much of their creativity to dealing 
with such ‘trivia’, and appropriately so. This form of recursion can stretch out 
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across very many steps, especially when syntactic dependences are considered to 
extend, as they do in real life, beyond individual sentences. It is, to all intents and 
purposes, infinite recursion. 
 Recursion takes a stronger form when the set of rules allows for choosing 
the very same individual rule at different steps, as necessary to model simple 
complementizer sentences like ‘John reports that Mary says that…’ or, as in 
Dante’s 13th canto of the Inferno, ‘Cred' ïo ch'ei credette ch'io credesse che tante 
voci uscisser, tra quei bronchi…’. 
 Yet more complicated forms of recursion occur when instead of a linear 
chain, that, for example, includes two non-terminal elements A e B (Verb Phrases 
and Noun Phrases, say), which take terminal values a1b1a2b2 a3b3, one has an 
embedded structure like a1a2a3b1b2 b3 or even a1a2a3b3b2 b1. Formal grammars that 
admit these structures are the less restricted ones, but it seems obvious that such 
structures are needed in order to model natural language without having to 
resort to byzantine constructs. The design of artificial systems that produce 
language-like strings endowed with such embedded structures is difficult, and it 
has been suggested that non-human primates cannot speak because they cannot 
manage the embedded type of recursion (Fitch & Hauser 2004). Yet there is no 
convincing evidence that non-human primates can acquire, and speak fluently, 
natural languages even without embedded structures (Hauser et al. 2002). And 
from the point of view of messing up the correspondence between processing 
along a fixed anatomical hierarchy and along a dynamically rearranged syntactic 
tree, embeddings are not needed: The simpler types of non-embedding recursion 
are sufficient — especially when recursion is expressed along several distinct 
dimensions. A point about embeddings which is often overlooked is that humans 
generally have trouble understanding, and rarely produce, embedded structures 
with more than 3 or 4 levels of embedding. Thus the distinction between infinite 
recursion in humans and finite in other species, proposed by Hauser et al. (2002) 
does not coincide with that informing the experiments of Fitch & Hauser (2004), 
between finite levels of embedding in humans and zero in other species.  
 What the observation of even simple forms of recursion suggests is that one 
should abandon the hypothesis that, during language production, processing 
should occur along an ordered hierarchy of cortical areas, whether or not 
specialized for distinct operations (as ‘modules’ in the Fodorian sense; Fodor, 
1983). Such hypothesis originates in computer science and in the block diagrams 
of early cognitive psychology, but is completely foreign to the world of cortical 
information processing, where recurrence is the rule. If humans were to process 
information along a feed-forward series of stations when they speak, they would 
be singularly handicapped, given that all other mammals, and other amniotes, 
and humans when they do not speak, use complex recurrent circuits all the time. 
It would be very odd if recurrent processing were to be silenced only in order to 
permit, of all things, a prominently recursive functionality such as language! 
 It seems, therefore, that excess reliance on artificial intelligence approaches 
to language, on trying to analyze language as it would be if it had evolved among 
computers and not among humans, has led astray the search for the neuronal 
mechanisms of language production, which conceivably have to be found among 
generic cortical mechanisms. But perhaps with a twist. 
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3. Quantity May Produce Quality 
 
What distinguishes the human cortex from that of other mammals are its dimen-
sions. In the past, it was thought that the human brain was larger than that of 
other mammals only in relation to body weight, because in absolute terms, 
elephants (5 kg) and whales (8 kg) have larger brains than humans (1.4 kg). 
Recently, however, Suzana Herculano-Houzel (2009) has discussed the possibility 
that the human cortex may have more neurons, also in absolute number, than 
any other mammal (and any other living organism). Her argument is based on 
the observation that the human cortex appears to scale up linearly with respect to 
other primates, with an approximately constant density of cells per unit volume; 
whereas with rodents the scaling is strongly sub-linear: A large rodent like the 
Capybara has much reduced density, and many fewer cells than expected in a 
linearly scaled up mouse of that body weight. While the scaling laws for the 
density of neurons in proboscidea and cetaceans are not known, it is likely, she 
argues, that they will end up making the largest whale and elephant brains less 
dense, as with rodents, resulting in total number of neurons in their cerebral 
cortices around 3 billion, compared to 16 billion in the human cortex. So, the 
human cortex would be the one with more neurons, after all. 
 Other quantitative parameters that affect the capabilities of neuronal 
networks are those that determine their connectivity. The observation of uniform 
design principles for the cerebral neocortex, across mammalian species and 
cortical areas, should not be taken to imply that the ‘canonical’ cortical circuit 
(Douglas & Martin 1991) is exactly the same, hence tacitly assume it to operate 
always in the same manner (Rakic 2008). Guy Elston, in fact, has argued now for 
a number of years that important quantitative differences exist in the number of 
spines present on the dendrites of pyramidal cells. Focusing on estimating the 
number of spines on basal dendrites, taken to be indicative of the number of 
independent recurrent synaptic inputs from other pyramidal cells nearby, he has 
reported much lower numbers in occipital than in temporal or frontal cortex, e.g., 
1,000 vs. 7,000 or 9,000, respectively, in the macaque. Further, the corresponding 
numbers are all significantly higher in the human cortex, ca. 2,000, 13,000, and 
15,000, respectively (Elston et al. 2001). Such quantitative differences are normally 
overlooked in conceptual reasoning, but they can easily produce qualitative 
differences in the functionality of a neural network. 
 
3.1. Phase Transitions 
 
The physics of phase transitions offers a poignant model for how quantitative 
differences in some parameter describing a complex system of interacting units 
can generate major qualitative differences in the collective behavior of the 
system. This will not be reviewed here, but it suffices to note that conceptual 
causal reasoning alone, where consequences are logically associated to qualities, 
with disregard for quantities, would have had difficulties explaining why water 
is liquid at 33° F, but turns into ice just 2 degrees below, or why a ferromagnetic 
material can suddenly lose its properties upon heating. Conceptual explanations, 
sadly still the dominant epistemological paradigm in the cognitive sciences, are 
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inadequate when dealing with phase transitions. The mathematical techniques 
originally developed to analyze models intended to describe one particularly 
complex type of materials exhibiting phase transitions, the so-called spin glasses, 
have instead been successfully adapted to analyze models of associative memory 
networks, following the suggestion by John Hopfield (1982). Such networks, like 
spin glasses, exhibit phase transitions, for example, when their effective ‘temper-
ature’ — a measure of the variability ascribed to noise — changes a bit, but also 
with changes in their connectivity (Amit et al. 1987, Treves & Rolls 1991). 
Attractor states representing memory items then disappear, if either the effective 
temperature is too high or the connectivity too low in relation to memory load, 
and the network enters a phase in which it cannot function as an associative 
memory. This is the phase transition associated with storage capacity, which we 
can denote with the critical memory load — the maximum number of memory 
items pc above which associative retrieval fails.  
 Most studies of formal/mathematical models of associative memory have 
focused on single networks, which have often been interpreted as representing a 
patch of cortex, for example, 1 mm2, containing of order 105 neurons. Valentino 
Braitenberg, however, has proposed considering the entire cortex, or at least its 
fronto-temporal associative areas, as an “associative memory machine” (Braiten-
berg & Schüz 1991), including, in the human brain, of order 105 patches with 105 
pyramidal cells each (Braitenberg 1978; see Fig. 2). One can consider a mathe-
matical model of such a two-tier associative memory network, in which neurons 
are grouped into compartments with dense internal connectivity and sparse 
connectivity between compartments. A model of this type can be called modular, 
but not in a Fodorian sense, since all the modules, representing real patches but 
as if they had sharp boundaries, have the same structure and mode of operation. 
It shows phase transitions, at least the storage capacity phase transition, in that 
the asymptotic attractor states correlated with each of p stored memory patterns 
are only present when both the internal connectivity and the one between 
modules are sufficiently dense, in relation to p (O’Kane & Treves 1992). 
 Specifically, the memory patterns can be defined across the entire network 
as composed of local patterns stored in each module, which can store S local 
attractors if the number of internal connections per unit, Cs, is sufficient. The 
number of long range connections per unit, Cl, has to be sufficient to support the 
retrieval of the p stored combination of local attractors, against the interference of 
all other possible combinations. The minimal values for Cs and Cl that allow for 
successful retrieval, given p and S, depend in a complex manner on the para-
meters characterizing the architecture of the network and the memory represen-
tations it encodes (Fulvi Mari & Treves 1998). This makes it convenient to analyze 
a simplified model, in which the lower tier of the modules with their internal 
connectivity is replaced by a symbolic representation, in terms of variables which 
can take multiple values standing for the multiple local attractors of the full 
model (Fig. 2). 
 These variables are called Potts units, and can be thought of as tiny vectors 
pointing towards the multiple directions of a hyper-pyramid in S dimensions, 
with its vertex at the origin, a vertex that stands for the inactive state of the local 
module. Such a Potts version of an associative memory network, which then 
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explicitly models only the upper tier of the two-tier architecture, has first been 
analyzed by Kanter (1988) and then by Bollé et al. (1991, 1993). They considered 
discrete Potts units, which can be in a state or another but not partly in a state 
and partly in another. Graded-response units have been considered later (Treves 
2005) and they allow a more realistic modeling of local patch dynamics, including 


















Figure 2:  From the cortex to Braitenberg’s ‘skeleton’ model (larger arrow) to the Potts model 
(small arrows), through abstraction and simplification. Each Potts unit has S ‘attractor’ 
states (filled) plus the ‘quiescent’ state (empty circle). 
 
 
3.2. Latching Dynamics 
 
Including a model of firing rate adaptation leads, in the presence of correlations 
among the global attractors, to a new phenomenon: latching dynamics. Latching 
dynamics is the hopping of the network from one attractor state to another, 
where the first, while decaying away due to neuronal fatigue, acts as a cue to re-
trieve the second, due to their being correlated. The process can be repeated a few 
times or even indefinitely, in which case one talks of infinite latching. 
 Latching dynamics are not recursive per se. If the transitions from one at-
tractor σ(n) to the next are random, there are no rules of the type σ(n+1) = Ω[σ(n)] 
being recursively applied at each transition. If the transition probabilities are non-
trivially structured, however, either sculpted by a learning process or at least em-
bedded in the correlations between attractors, then the transition matrix Ω[σ] can 
be regarded as implicitly recursive. It was in fact shown that even for a simple 
non-structured Potts network the transition probabilities are structured, by the 
correlations, and 3 distinct classes of transitions can occur between attractor 
states (Russo et al. 2008). More interestingly, it was shown that these transitions 
cannot be described by a first-order Markov process, as they depend on pre-
ceding states, much as words do in natural languages (Russo et al. 2011), so one 
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has to think in terms of long probabilistic dependencies σ(n+1) = Ω[σ(n), σ(n–1), 
σ(n–2), …]. The Potts network has memory, in its spontaneous gibberish. 
 
3.3. The Phase Transition to Infinite Latching 
 
We have analyzed latching dynamics in a number of studies (Kropff & Treves 
2006, Russo et al. 2008, Russo et al. 2011) to which we refer for a more detailed 
description of this behavior of the Potts associative network model, and of its 
possible relation to neurophysiological observations. The point we want to note 
here is that latching may never occur, terminate by itself after a few steps, or con-
tinue indefinitely. Once the parameters of the Potts network are set, the exact du-
ration of the process, and whether it terminates or not, depend on the exact initial 
conditions. In a large network, however, the dependence on the initial conditions 
may become negligible, and if latching terminates after a while it has a well-
defined length, dependent only on structural parameters. One can then talk 
about a phase of finite latching (which may include a region of zero duration, 









Figure 3:  Latching dynamics are shown by plotting the time course of the overlaps of the state of 
the Potts network with each of p memory states (in different colors). Ideally, the network 
hops from attractor to attractor, with rapid transitions and protracted permanence in each 
attractor. In practice, with many choices of parameters, the observed dynamics are much 
noisier, a rumble-and-tumble with occasionally several overlaps simultaneously high, and 
many others significantly above chance level. Here, an input cue is presented at time 0, and 
then the network is left to its own dynamics. Time steps are in arbitrary units, but inter-
preting them as msecs, or as fractions of msecs, may be useful to suggest a correspondence 
with cognitive time scales. 
 
 
While our detailed analysis of the boundary between the phases of finite and 
infinite latching will be discussed elsewhere, it is useful to sketch the scenario 
that emerges from the possibility of an abrupt phase transition — a distinct phase 
transition from the storage capacity one, which we had labeled with the critical 
storage load pc. The network in the two phases is identical, and the only differ-
ence is in the numerical values of some parameter, for example the number S of 
local states of each patch/Potts unit or the connectivity C of the Potts units 
(related to the long-range connectivity in the underlying two-tier model, Cl). A 
small change in the value of the parameter then opens the gate for a distinct 
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emergent property, which is manifest in one phase and not in the other. In the 
Potts model of the two-tier cortical network there are therefore two critical boun-
daries. First, there is a boundary between retrieval and non-retrieval phases. The 
network cannot function as an associative memory because it cannot retrieve a 
memory item with a partial cue, when the storage load p is above a value pc pro-
portional to C and to S2 (Kropff & Treves 2005). Second, there is a boundary 
between finite and infinite latching. The network latches indefinitely when the 
memory load is above a certain critical value pl, because correlations among attrac-
tors increase with the memory load. At least in a certain parameter regime, simu-
lations indicate that pl does not depend on C and scales up with S, approximately 
linearly. A phase space for the network has to be drawn in (at least) 3 dimen-
sions, p, C and S, and two orthogonal sections though this phase space are shown 















Figure 4:  Two schematic cross sections through the 3D phase space of a Potts associative memory. 
In the p-C section, left, the network can operate as an associative memory (AM) below a 
critical value pc which is approximately linear in C. Above a value pl, which does not seem 
to depend on C, the network also latches indefinitely (+L). A quantitative increase in long-
range connectivity, at some point in the evolution of the human brain, may have triggered 
the emergence of indefinite latching. A similar phase transition (also depicted as a graded 
change through orange colors, because its exact nature has not been completely determined 
yet) from the AM to the +L phases may be seen in the p-S section, right. In this case pc is 
taken to be quadratic in S, and pl linear.  
 
 
 Our on-going analyses indicate that the phase diagram of even simple 
unstructured Potts networks is not as simple as suggested by Fig. 4. Still, the 
scenario remains open, that a slowly evolving quantitative increase in the connec-
tivity of the cortex may have suddenly crossed a critical threshold, in the human 
species, several tens of thousands years ago, that brought the cortical network 
into a phase characterized by long spontaneous latching sequences, or by their 
real cortical equivalent, without altering the intrinsic make-up of the network or 
any of its constituent properties. Latching is an emergent property, or a some-
what more complex set of emergent properties, which emerge when crossing 
certain thresholds.  





It is a long shot to extrapolate from transitions produced by randomly generated 
correlations among attractors, in a crude Potts network, to the recursive 
concatenation of linguistic structures in speech, even though latching transitions 
have been shown to display a certain degree of internal complexity (Russo et al. 
2008). Still, the Potts model indicates the possibility that a recursive mechanism 
may emerge through a phase transition, in a manner entirely unrelated to the 
hypothetical appearance, in evolution, of a novel piece of neural circuitry with 
specific language-adaptable properties (the mythical LAD), or to the refinement 
of specific connectional hierarchies among cortical areas. The latter may of course 
encroach on the originally non-hierarchical mechanism and complexify it, but 
they (the LAD and the hierarchy) may have nothing to do with the emergence of 
the mechanism. Further studies are needed in order to understand how latching 
dynamics can be sculpted in a more purposeful manner than by randomly 
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